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DAl<KE:

ACOMPELLING NEED
TO DISCRIMIN~TE

BY THEODORE ST. Al1TOINE
Dean. Michigan Law School

FOURTEEN

Two of America's most cherished values collided
head-on a few months ago, when the U.S. Supreme
Court began to come to grips with the most significant
civil rights suit since the school desegregation cases of
1954. Arrayed on one side is the principle of governmental "color-blindness," the appealing notion that
the color of a person's skin should have nothing to do
with the distribution of benefits or burdens by the
state.
Set against it is the goal of a truly integrated society, and the tragic realization that this objective cannot be achieved within the foreseeable future unless
race and color are taken into account by educators,
e mployers, and other key decision-makers, both
public and private.
Did the special admissions program at the University of California at Davis violate the equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal
Constitution? Allan Bakke said it did, and the
Supreme Court of California concurred when it sustained Bakke's complaint-at least in the absence of a
clearer demonstration that Davis could not integrate
its med ical school without resorting to racial
preferences.
Although distinguished legal authorities have said
the Constitution is "color-blind ," the Constitution
itself says no such thing. All that the Fourteenth

Amendment guarantees is "the equal protection of
the laws." The mandate of equal treatment, however,
would seem to presuppose equal status or circumstances. It is not unconstitutional to require the
rich to pay higher taxes than the poor, or to impose
military obligations on the young and healthy and not
on the old or the infirm, or to provide emergency
funds for the victims of natural disasters. Whether
government-sponsored preferences based on race are
constitutionally permissible should also depend, one
can reasonably maintain, upon an examination of the
similarity or dissimilarity in the contemporary situation of whites and minorities.
Arguably, of course, racial distinctions are
unique- a particular target of the post-Civil War
a mendments-and not to be compared with distinctions based on wealth or age or physical condition or
acts of God. And indeed the Supreme Court has
declared that race is a "suspect" governmental
classification. But even racial preferences may be
justified if they serve a compelling state interest and
are the least drastic means of accomplishing an appropriate end.
Moreover, whel,'e racial classtfication is used for
" benign" purposes, that is, to benefit rather than
disadvantage a minority group, some scholars contend that the less strict "rational basis" test of con·
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stitutionality should be applied. The Supreme Court
has upheld employment preferences for American Indians. The same Congress that adopted the Fourteenth Amendment passed Freedmen's Bureau
legislation, despite strenuous objections that it was
detrimental to whites.
Amidst these slippery legal abstractions, a few
stark facts stand out. At long last the nation has
realized that a sixth of its population cannot be excluded from the mainstream of business and professional life, without irreparable damage to our concept of justice and to the very fabric of our society.
Yet even as our institutions reach out a welcoming
hand, there is a grave threat that other pressures will
slam the door shut in the faces of aspiring minorities.
WHAT ARE LAW SCHOOLS DOING?
If we look only at minority applicants for law school,
about which the most complete data are available,
one can see the consequences of this brutal squeeze.
In the past dozen years, minority enrollment in
American law schools has increased from 700, or 1.3
percent, to more than 9,500, or 8.1 percent; if
preferential admissions were abandoned, it is
estimated that blacks and Chicanos would have comprised approximately 1 percent of the 1976 entering
class-about the same as in 1964. "The progress of a
decade," as the Association of American Law
Schools puts it, "would have been wiped out." The
situation in medical schools would probably have
been worse.
Does this mean minority applicants are unqualified? Not at all. Their carefully cultivated and
now burgeoning interest in professional studies has
ironically coincided with a veritable tidal wave of applicants in certain favored fields, chiefly law and
medicine, during the past two decades. Minorities
entered the contest at a time of skyrocketing credentials; they were brushed aside, not because they were
unqualified, but because they were outscored by
superior performers in the GPA (Grade Point
Average) and LSAT (Law School Admissions Test)
competitions.
My own school, Michigan, is a case in point. It
produced its first black graduate in 1870, and
through the years it has graduated many able black
lawyers, judges and public officials. Yet by 1965-66,
things had come to such a pass that there was not a
single black student in the entire school-and this at
a time when race relations had emerged as the country's most serious and divisive domestic problem.
That year we instituted a special admissions program. Without it, our admissions officer calculates
we would admit only two or three minority students a
year. This is so even though the mean LSA T score of
our entering minority students in 1976 was superior
to the mean LSA T score of the whole graduating
class of just 15 years before. To the best of my
knowledge, we admit no minority students today who
could not have breezed into my own first-year law
class in the fall of 1951.
Nearly everyone acknowledges the need for increased minority representation in the professions-especially in such a politically influential pro-

fession as the law. It is often contended, however, that
this can be accomplished without deliberate, colorconscious decision-making .. Some argue, as did
Justice Douglas in his opinion jn the earlier, mooted
DeFunis case involving preferential admissions to law
school, that the villain is the culturally biased LSAT.
Such persons insist that a more accurate means
should be devised to predict the academic performance of minority applicants. Others maintain that
much the same result could be obtained by a raceneutral criterion like socioeconomic disadvantage.
Careful studies have disclosed that both these views
are illusory. The LSA T does not underpredict the law
school records of blacks and Chicanos; if anything, it
may slightly overpredict them. Use of socioeconomic
deprivation as a standard would mean one of two
things. According to the best available data, only
about 10 percent of those who would be admitted
under a disadvantaged special admissions program
would be black or Chicano. Thus, if the percentage of
disadvantaged remained equivalent to the percentage
of minorities currently enrolled (approximately 8
percent), the number of blacks and Chicanos would
fall back to around 1 percent. On the other hand, to
maintain anything like the existing representation of
minorities in law schools would require the expansion
of disadvantaged programs to an extent that would be
professionally foolhardy, politically unacceptable and
financially impossible.
The inescapable conclusion is that "colorblindness" is incompatible with a continuing infusion
of substantial numbers of minorities into high-level
business and professional positions, and into the
educational institutions that prepare persons for such
positions. Does there exist, then, the "compelling
state interest" that is necessary to justify a racial
classification by government under the sterner and
likelier constitutional test? Confining attention for the
moment to the legal profession and legal education, I
think several possible compelling societal interests can
be identified.
WHAT IS COMPELLING STATE INTEREST?
First and foremost is the urgent need for more minority lawyers. Minorities constitute one-sixth of our
population; in 1970 they constituted less than onefiftieth of the bar. They were even more disproportionately underrepresented in Mississippi, Alabama,
Georgia, and other Southern states with large black
populations. Even the best-intentioned white civil
rights lawyers in the sixties often confessed their inability to get across to black clients effectively, to win
their trust and speak their language. At the other end
of the spectrum, minorities were also disproportionately underrepresented in prestigious corporate
law firms, legal departments, and federal agencies. In
short, minority counsel was lacking for minority
clients, and the advocacy of minority interests was
lacking along the corridors of power.
The lawyer is the preeminent molder of American
public policy. Although we should like to assume that
all policy makers will try to deal fairly with all groups
in our society, we must face up to historical reality:
no ethnic group can be sure that its interests will be
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fully protected and promoted until it has its share of
representatives in high places. So the Irish found it to
be in Boston, so the Italians and Jews found it to be in
New York, and so the blacks and Hispanics have
found it to be in every large city in the country. Since
law is a natural route for the outsider to political and
economic power, it can be said that opening up the
law to blacks and other emerging minorities is a compelling concern to the whole of society.
This is not simply a matter of doing belated justice
for a previously deprived group. The civility of community life, the peace of mind of every citizen, and
public order itself, all ultimately depend on a sense of
belonging, a sence of sharing by every group in our
social system. The majority advances its own essential
interests when it ensures both minority insights and
minority involvement in the decision-making process.
The young black from the ghetto, or the young
Chicano from the barrio, receives an important and
encouraging message when he learns that an older
cousin has been accepted by a good law school, or that
a friend of his uncle has been elected county prosecutor, or that any minority person has been appointed a judge. White middle-class youngsters take
most of this for granted. For many minorities it may
be a crucial signal of hope, a window opening on a
world about which they had never dreamed before.
Each minority acceptance into law school, each
minority admission to the bar, may thus have
reverberations for the good of all society that the
parallel success of almost no young white could ever
match. Such contrasting social dividends, it would
seem, could fairly be taken into account in any intelligent calculus of group costs and group benefits.
Most major law schools have never admitted
students entirely "by the numbers," that is, solely on
the basis of GPAs and LSA T scores. Interviews and
letters of recommendation evidencing personal
qualities important in the practice of law, unusual
geographical origins or socioeconomic backgrounds,
significant work experience or graduate training, are
all commonly given substantial weight in the admissions process. The aim is twofold. First, law schools
wish to produce the ablest most effective lawyers;
these are not necessarily the best exam-takers.
Second, law schools wish to ensure a diverse,
heterogeneous student body that will contribute to a
rich and meaningful educational experience for all.
This latter objective suggests another compelling
reason for an adequate minority presence in law
schools. Students preparing for law practice in today's
world have a vital need to know what blacks, Chicanos
and other minorities are thinking about. Their insights may have a special value because of their particular backgrounds and experiences. I recall, for example, my own contracts class once coming alive
when two blacks got into a spirited and perceptive exchange about the "mark-up" pricing policies of ghetto merchants. It is important, too, for white students
to be aware of the goals and aspirations of minorities,
and their attitude about the proper future direction of
the law.
In addition, as my colleague Terrance Sandalow

has observed, the presence of minorities provides an
opportunity to increase effective communication
across racial lines. Otherwise there would be left
unremedied what he describes as "the inability of
some white students to examine critically arguments
by a black, or the difficulty experienced by others in
expressing their disagreements with blacks on such
issues."
Medical schools and the medical profession do not
occupy so central a place as law schools and the legal
profession in the formulation of general public policy.
To that extent some of the arguments just advanced in
favor of preferential minority admissions in law do not
have quite the same force when applied to medicine,
or to other technical professions.
Other arguments carry about equal weight with
regard to various professions. There is the same need
for minority practitioners to handle the problems of
minority clients and minority patients. There is the
same need for role models for aspiring minority
youngsters. And there is the same need for minority
input in resolving the internal policy issues confronting each individual profession. In medicine, for example, is there an appropriate allocation of resources
to deal with such matters as infant mortality, prenatal
care, cancer research and the development of artificial
life support systems? Minority views on these questions might differ considerably from those of whites.
A NEW DIMENSION IN EQUAL PROTECTION?
The Supreme Court's decision in Bakke is almost certain to have implications far beyond the area of
preferential admissions to professional schools or to
higher education generally. The federal government's
whole "affirmative action" program for employees of
government contractors is likely to be affected. In the
work force, just as in selective educational institutions, the statistics on minority status are disheartening. Even after a decade of federally enforced nondiscrimination in employment, minorities are still
twice as likely as whites not to have jobs. The median
family income of blacks as compared with that of
whites has improved negligibly, from 54 percent in
1964 to 58 percent in the mid-seventies. Minorities
continue to occupy a disproportionately low percentage of the more attractive positions. If a more fully
integrated work force and genuine equality of job opportunity can be considered compelling state interests, affirmative action programs to boost minority
employment would seem as legitimate constitutionally
as preferential admissions policies in education.
Admissions and employment preferences for
minorities might be made more palatable for opponents if they could come to realize that at present
being a minority may well be a valid "qualification"
for many jobs. There is a demonstrated need today for
minority role models, especially in the higher status
occupations. Whites, as well as minorities, stand to
profit from gleaning the insights of minority professors, fellow students, lawyers, business people,
newspaper writers, and so on.
More fundamentally, our entire society should be
(Please turn to page 55)
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enriched by the opening u-p of a vast new spectrum of
job opportunities for large, previously excluded
segments of the population. In this sense, the black
who is preferred as a teacher or a doctor or a pipefitter
is not being favored as an individual It merely so happens that, at this moment in history, minorities are
endowed with q ualities that must be distributed
throughout a wide range of positions in industry and
the professions if we are to solve one of our most pressing social prnblems. Such an approach may be profoundly at odds with our traditions of individual merit
and race neutrality, but I believe it accords with the
realities of the seventies.
Ultimateiy, the legitimacy of preferential treatment
for minorities should turn on a judicious appraisal of
the gains and losses for our society, and not on
abstract concepts like "color-blindness." Deliberate
race-based preferences a1·c dangerous medicine,

justified onJy by the gravest circumstances, and they
must not be allowed to become habit-fo rming. There
is the obvious risk of estra11ging white ethnics, and indeed all groups who have good historical grounds for
abhorring any practice that smacks of racial quotas.
There is the further risk of perpetuating racial
stereotypes that must be purged even from our subconscious. Balanced against these risks is the certainty that an absolutist approach to color-blindness will
call a halt to the past decade's promising, if often
fu mbling, efforts at integration in education a nd
employment.
Bakke presents the Supreme Court with a cruel
practica l choice. It also presents the court with an opportunity to find a new dimension in the Fourteenth
Amendment, and to see that "equal protection" is not
a mathematician's table of equ ivalents, but a realist's
injunction to treat alike those who are, in this
remarkably diverse world, truly alike.
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